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NOTES
HOLLAND V ILLINOIS: A SIXTH AMENDMENT
ATTACK ON THE USE OF
DISCRIMINATORY PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a de-
fendant in a criminal proceeding the right to trial by an impartial jury.' This
guarantee requires that the procedure used to select a jury panel provide a
fair possibility that the jury will represent a cross section of the community.2
To achieve the "fair possibility," the Supreme Court has held that the jury
venire must reflect a fair cross section of the community.' The Court, how-
ever, has not interpreted the sixth amendment as requiring that the petit
jury, comprised from the venire, necessarily contain a fair cross section of
the community.4
While the sixth amendment mandates that a jury be comprised of a repre-
sentative group, the requirement that each juror be impartial limits the pool
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
530 (1975) (right to a jury composed of a representative segment of the community); Williams
v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (six person jury is not unconstitutional because there exists
the possibility that the panel will represent a fair cross section).
3. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530. The requirement of a fair possibility of a cross section on the
jury venire (the group of members from the community summoned randomly to comprise the
jury pool) is based on the constitutional goal of securing a petit jury (the actual panel chosen)
that reflects the judgment of the community. A statute precluding women from jury service
denied the possibility of a fair cross section of the community on the jury venire and thus
violated the sixth amendment. Id. at 530-31. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156
(1968) (a jury of peers provides the defendant an "inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge"); see also Sulli-
van, Deterring the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 477,
501 (1984) ("the purpose of the fair cross section requirement [is] to maximize the interaction
of community values, perspectives, and beliefs"). Thus, if a jury venire does not reflect a fair
cross section of the community, the defendant may assert a sixth amendment claim because the
fair possibility of a cross section of the community on the petit jury is precluded.
4. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 183-84. The defendant has no sixth amendment claim if the
petit jury, after having been selected from a jury venire comprised of a fair cross section, does
not itself contain a fair cross section. A jury which is selected from a fair cross section is
impartial "regardless of the mix of individual viewpoints actually represented on the jury." Id
at 184.
Catholic University Law Review
of viable candidates. To eliminate extremes of partiality or bias from the
jury and to help ensure that a verdict will be based solely upon on the evi-
dence presented at the trial,5 the American criminal justice system provides
counsel with both challenges for cause and peremptory challenges to prevent
certain persons from serving on a jury.6 Thus, if voir dire7 reveals that a
prospective juror possesses a bias that is likely to predispose the juror to a
particular outcome, counsel for either the defense or the prosecution may
move the court to excuse that juror for cause.' Alternatively, counsel may
exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a particular juror from the
panel.9 Counsel use peremptory challenges strategically to structure a jury
that will be more sympathetic to their client's position.'0
5. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
6. Members of a community are randomly selected for jury service. A pool of prospec-
tive jurors is then summoned to an individual courtroom. Of these prospective jurors, some
will be dismissed by the judge for specific hardship reasons. Then, counsel may state a reason
to exclude a particular juror for cause and the judge will determine whether the reason stated
satisfies "cause" to exclude that juror. If the proferred "cause" is found insufficient, counsel
may then use a peremptory challenge to exclude a juror without stating a reason. See J. VAN
DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTA-
TIVE JURY PANELS, 85-147 (1977) (discussing the jury selection process).
7. Voir dire is the questioning of prospective jurors to determine their ability to decide a
particular case impartially. The voir dire examination may be conducted by counsel or the
presiding judge. See Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power" 27 STAN. L. REV.
545, 545-49 (1975) (explaining the voir dire process).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c)(2) (1988). The court may exclude a prospective juror if the juror
is unable to render impartial service. See Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980) (the proper
constitutional standard for juror exclusion is if the juror's views would "prevent or substan-
tially impair" his duties as a juror); Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 433 (1887) (listing reasons for
excuse for cause, including "[h]aving formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief that
the prisoner is guilty or not guilty of the offence charged"); see also Note, Limiting the Peremp-
tory Challenge: Representation of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1733 n.78 (1977)
(challenges for cause are not ,sustained when they are based solely on group affiliation).
9. Peremptory challenges are a statutorily granted right but are limited in number. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-100(a) (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-10-
104 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-82(g) (West 1985); IND, CODE ANN. § 35-37-1-3
(Burns 1985); MONT. CODE ANN.'§ 46-16-305 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-262 (1990).
10. See Note, supra note 8, at 1718 n.19. The Supreme Court recognized the importance
of the perem'ptory challenge asearly as 1887 in Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68 (1887). In
Hayes the Court notedthat impartiality requires freedom from bias. The Court found that:
Experience has shown that one of the most effective means to free the jury-box from
men unfit to be there is the exercise of the peremptory challenge. The public prose-
cutor may have the strongest reasons to distrust the character of a juror offered, from
his habits and' associations, and yet ,find it difficult to formulate and sustain a legal
objection to him. In such cases, the' peremptory challenge is a protection against his
being accepted.
Id at 70.
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Until recently, the peremptory challenge did not require showing of cause
under any circumstances.1 1 Counsel could exercise the peremptory chal-
lenge without articulating a reason for the challenge, without submitting to
inquiry, and without judicial oversight. 2 Attorneys have exercised the per-
emptory challenge based upon no more substantive reasons than the pro-
spective juror's appearance and gestures.13 Because the function of the
peremptory challenge is to help assemble an impartial jury, the Supreme
Court has recognized the peremptory challenge as one of the most important
rights present in a criminal trial and allows counsel wide latitude in making
these challenges. 4 Thus, while the Constitution does not require courts to
allow peremptory challenges, the sixth amendment right that a criminal de-
fendant be tried by an impartial jury provides a basis for them to do so.1
Yet, some commentators have questioned the uninhibited discretion af-
forded counsel in exercising the peremptory challenge.16 They argue that
complete discretion in the use of peremptory challenges violates the sixth
amendment by allowing counsel to employ the challenge in a discriminatory
manner.1 7  Thus, a claim against a jury selection procedure may arise if the
selection procedure is inherently discriminatory either in the selection of the
jury venire or the petit jury."
11. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (limiting the uninhibited discretion
accorded to the peremptory challenge under the fourteenth amendment equal protection
clause).
12. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892). In Lewis the Court also noted that
the right of challenge has always been held essential to the fairness of trial by jury. Id
13. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965).
14. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219. The roots of the peremptory challenge have been traced to
common law England. Id at 213. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure establish the
number of peremptory challenges that each party may exercise in federal court, but is silent as
to the manner in which peremptories may be exercised. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b).
15. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ......
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. See, e.g., Note, Rethinking Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, 86 CoLuM. L.
REv. 1357, 1358 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge] (unfet-
tered exercise of the peremptory challenge results in underrepresentation of minorities); Note,
Batson v. Kentucky: The New and Improved Peremptory Challenge, 38 HASTINGs L.J. 1195,
1210 (1987) [hereinafter Note, The New and Improved Peremptory Challenge] (constitutional
rights of the defendant outweigh the government's interest in having unchecked peremptory
challenges).
17. See Note, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials 21
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 227, 230 (1986) (the American justice system should rely on chal-
lenges for cause and extended voir dire rather than peremptory challenges, which allow the
prosecutor to eliminate minorities, and thus eliminate the possibility of a trial by an impartial
jury). Id.
18. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529 (1975) (discrimination evident in the jury
venire selection); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (discrimination evident in
1991]
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The Supreme Court has held that the fourteenth amendment provides one
constitutional basis for attacking the discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges.19 In Batson v. Kentucky," the Court held that the use of peremptory
challenges to exclude African Americans from a petit jury solely because of
their race violated the equal protection of the fourteenth amendment.2 For
the first time, the Court allowed inquiry into counsel's reasons for exercising
a particular peremptory challenge.22 Although the defendant in Batson al-
ternatively attacked the use of peremptory challenges as a violation of the
sixth amendment right to an impartial jury,23 the Court did not address that
claim.24
Subsequently, the Supreme Court did address whether peremptory chal-
lenges can be attacked on discrimination grounds under the sixth amend-
ment in Holland v. Illino 25 In Holland, the defendant sought to extend the
application of the fair cross section requirement of the sixth amendment to
the petit jury by urging the court to oversee the use of peremptory chal-
lenges.26 The issue in Holland was complicated by the fact that the defend-
ant, a white man, objected on the basis of racial discrimination to the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to preclude African Americans
from the petit jury.27
the petit jury selection). A showing of discrimination in petit jury selection poses a more
difficult problem. For example, if all African Americans or all women are statutorily excluded
from jury service, discrimination in the selection of the venire would be evident. See Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (statute which excluded African Americans from serving
on a jury held unconstitutional). Grounds for a claim of discrimination become less clear,
however, if African Americans or women are excluded from the jury panel through the use of
peremptory challenges.
19. Fourteenth amendment claims were raised in Batson, 476 U.S. at 83, and Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203 (1965).
20. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 97. The Court acknowledged that its holding imposed a limit on the use of the
peremptory challenge, but emphasized that the explanation for the peremptory challenge need
not meet the standards for an exclusion for cause. Id
23. Id. at 83. Batson claimed that the prosecutor's peremptory exclusion of African
Americans violated his right to an impartial jury drawn from a cross section of the commu-
nity. Id.
24. Id The Court refused to express any view on the merits of the sixth amendment
claim, stating that the claim properly turned on the fourteenth amendment equal protection
issue. Id at 84 n.4.
25. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
26. Id at 477-78. Holland claimed that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to
exclude all African Americans from his jury prevented a distinctive group from being repre-
sented on his jury, thereby violating his sixth amendment right to a petit jury composed of a
fair cross section of the community. Id.
27. Id at 476. According to the testimony, the state prosecutor used his peremptory
challenges to preclude the only two African Americans represented in the forty member venire
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Daniel Holland was charged with aggravated kidnapping, rape, deviant
sexual assault, armed robbery, and aggravated battery of a police officer.2"
The jury found him guilty on all but one charge, and the court sentenced
Holland to eighty years imprisonment.2 9 Holland appealed 3' and the Illi-
nois Appellate Court reversed the conviction based on a violation of the de-
fendant's Miranda rights.3 ' The State appealed to the Supreme Court of
Illinois. 32 Holland reasserted his claim that the State violated the Batson
ruling by using its peremptory challenges to exclude African American ju-
rors from the panel solely on the basis of race.3 3 The Supreme Court of
Illinois refused to address that issue, holding instead that a white defendant
lacked standing to assert a fourteenth amendment claim.34 Holland alterna-
tively argued that the exclusion of African Americans from his petit jury
violated his sixth amendment right to a jury that represented a fair cross
section of the community. 35 The Supreme Court of Illinois found that the
peremptory exclusion of African Americans or other minorities does not vio-
late the fair cross section requirement of the sixth amendment. 36 The court
reinstated Holland's convictions, and the defendant subsequently petitioned
from the petit jury. People v. Holland, 147 Ill. App. 3d 323, 326, 497 N.E.2d 1230, 1233
(1986).
28. People v. Holland, 121 Il. 2d 136, 140, 520 N.E.2d 270, 272 (1987). The charges
were based on a sexual assault of a female teenager and the resulting confrontation with two
intervening police officers. Id.
29. Id. at 141, 520 N.E.2d at 272.
30. Holland, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 324, 497 N.E.2d at 1232. The primary issue raised by
Holland to the Illinois appellate court was that his waiver of his Miranda rights was invalid.
Id. Holland also raised the following issues: (1) that the State used its peremptory challenges
to exclude black jurors in violation of Batson v. Kentucky; (2) that his trial counsel was ineffec-
tive; (3) that his conviction for armed robbery was improper because the State failed to prove
that he took the complainant's property by force or threat of force; (4) that imposition of an
extended-term sentence for aggravated kidnapping was improper; and (5) that imposition of
consecutive sentences was improper. Id. (citation omitted).
31. Id. at 326, 497 N.E.2d at 1233.
32. Holland, 121 Ill. 2d at 142, 520 N.E.2d at 272.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 157, 520 N.E.2d at 279. The court reasoned that because the defendant was
white, he could not prove that members of his race were excluded impermissibly. Id. Batson
was available only to a defendant who contended that the prosecutor had used his peremptory
challenges in a discriminatory manner to exclude members of the defendant's race. This Note
does not address the issue of standing. But see Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 488 (1990)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (proposing that white defendants have standing to assert a Batson
claim). In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court held that a defendant has a fourteenth
amendment claim against race-based exclusions, regardless of whether the defendant is of the
same race of the excluded juror. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
35. Holland, 121 Ill. 2d at 158, 520 N.E.2d at 280.
36. Id.
1991]
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the United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari." The Supreme
Court granted the writ solely to review Holland's sixth amendment claim.38
The Supreme Court affirmed Holland's convictions and refused to extend
the fair cross section requirement to the petit jury. 39 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Scalia held first that a petitioner need not be a member of the
group excluded from jury service to have standing to assert a sixth amend-
ment claim.' The majority, however, rejected Holland's claim that the ex-
clusion of all African Americans from the petit jury through the use of
peremptory challenges established a prima facie sixth amendment viola-
tion.4" ' Rather, the majority stated that the sixth amendment guarantees
only the inclusion of all cognizable groups on the jury venire.42 Thus, the
Court held that the sixth amendment fair cross section requirement did not
restrict the use of peremptory challenges because it does not apply to the
petit jury.4 3 The Court based its holding on the text of the sixth amendment,
which guarantees a defendant an impartial jury rather than a representative
jury." To further support the holding, the Court also relied on the tradi-
tion and importance of the peremptory challenge as a means of "assuring the
selection of a qualified and unbiased jury."'4
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion agreeing that the fair cross
section requirement does not apply to the petit jury. 6 He wrote separately,
however, to assert that Holland had a valid fourteenth amendment equal
protection claim against peremptory challenges excluding African Ameri-
cans even though Holland was white.4 7 In his opinion, Justice Kennedy
condemned the racially based exclusion of jurors under the fourteenth
amendment.48
The dissenting opinion, delivered by Justice Marshall, advocated the ex-
tension of the fair cross section requirement of the sixth amendment to the
37. Holland v. Illinois, 489 U.S. 1051 (1989).
38. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 486 n.3 (1990). The Court refused to review Hol-
land's equal protection claim because Holland did not seek review of that issue before the
Court. Id.
39. Id. at 487.
40. Id. at 477.
41. Id at 478.
42. Id
43. Id. at 480.
44. Id
45. Id. at 484 (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986)) (emphasis in
original).
46. Id. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
47. Id at 489.
48. Id.
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petit jury.4 9 Justice Marshall argued that in reaching its "startling result,"
the majority misinterpreted the purposes of the fair cross section require-
ment, characterized the difficulty in prohibiting racial discrimination in jury
selection as near impossible, and ignored Court precedent."0 The dissent
reasoned that the exercise of peremptory challenges solely to exclude Afri-
can Americans from a jury panel violates the sixth amendment right to an
impartial jury because it eliminates the possibility of a fair cross section of
the community on the petit jury.5" The dissent challenged the majority's
reasoning as contradicting precedent, which the dissent found to justify its
proposed limit on the peremptory challenge.52 The dissent concluded that
the use of peremptory challenges to remove members of a cognizable group
from the jury panel constitutes a prima facie violation of the sixth amend-
ment and should not be permitted.53
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissenting opinion, argued that the use of
discriminatory peremptory challenges violates the sixth amendment fair
cross section requirement.54 Justice Stevens reasoned that any jury selected
by discriminatory means cannot be impartial.55 Justice Stevens concluded
that neutral selection is the best means to insure a jury decision reflective of
community mores.5 6
This Note examines the use of the peremptory challenge and its relation to
the fundamental rights guaranteed under the sixth amendment. This Note
traces the similarities of the fourteenth amendment challenge to the peremp-
tory exclusion of jurors from the petit jury as a precursor to the sixth amend-
ment challenge addressed in Holland v. Illinois. This Note then analyzes the
judicial trend regarding the sixth amendment fair cross section requirement
and whether it extends to the petit jury. This Note next reviews the major-
ity, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Holland and concludes that the
majority's holding is well grounded in precedent and fairly balances consti-
tutional goals with procedural considerations. Finally, this Note suggests
that the decision, by refusing to allow scrutiny of an attorney's reasons for
exercising the peremptory challenge under the sixth amendment, prevents
administrative problems that would adversely affect the jury selection proce-
dure and secures the effectiveness of the peremptory challenge as a mecha-
nism to ensure an impartial jury.
49. Id. at 490 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 493.
52. Id. at 495.
53. Id. at 500.
54. Id. at 504 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 515.
56. Id.
1991]
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I. CHALLENGES TO DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES
A. Fourteenth Amendment Analysis: The Initial Attack on the
Peremptory Challenge
The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." As applied to per-
emptory challenges, the fourteenth amendment can be used to limit peremp-
tory challenges that exclude jurors based on race or color.
Strauder v. West Virginia58 was the first attack before the United States
Supreme Court on discriminatory jury selection proceedings under a four-
teenth amendment equal protection argument. Strauder, an African Ameri-
can, was found guilty of murder by a jury composed entirely of white
males.5 9 Strauder appealed the conviction, contending that he could not en-
joy the full and equal benefit of the laws as enjoyed by white citizens if mem-
bers of his race were statutorily excluded from jury service.6" The Supreme
Court held that the state law denying African Americans the right to serve
on a jury violated the equal protection mandate of the fourteenth amend-
ment and reversed the conviction. 6'
That same year, however, in Virginia v. Rives,62 the Court held that under
the fourteenth amendment a criminal defendant was not entitled to a pro-
portional number of representatives of his race on either the petit jury or the
jury venire. 6a In Rives, two African American defendants were convicted of
57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The amendment commands that:
[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
58. 100 U.S. 303 (1880), overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
59. Id. at 304.
60. Id.
61. Id at 309. The Court emphasized that it cannot be said "that while every white man
is entitled to a trial by a jury selected from persons of his own race or color, or, rather, selected
without discrimination against his color, and a negro is not, the latter is equally protected by
the law with the former." Id The Court reasoned that the state law denied the defendant an
essential element of trial by jury which was a jury "composed of the peers or equals of the
person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows,
associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which he holds." Id. at 308.
62. 100 U.S. 313 (1880) (denying defendant's motion that an all white jury venire be mod-
ified to allow one-third to be composed of colored men), overruled by Greenwood v. Peacock,
384 U.S. 808 (1966).
63. Id. at 322-23.
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murder by a jury drawn from a venire composed entirely of white males. 64
The defendants appealed the convictions, claiming a fourteenth amendment
right to have the jury venire include a proportionate number of African
Americans.65 The Court found that "[a] mixed jury in a particular case is
not essential to the equal protection of the laws."66 The Court reasoned that
it had no authority to modify a venire which had been drawn according to
law.67 Therefore, while the Strauder Court acknowledged that criminal de-
fendants have the right to a jury impanelled without the taint of discrimina-
tion,6" the Rives decision established that the failure to produce an accurate
racial cross section does not violate the equal protection clause.69
In both Strauder and Rives, the Court addressed whether the fourteenth
amendment applied when the State was comprising the venire. The Court
did not address the use of peremptory challenges. In fact, nearly a century
passed before the Court addressed the issue of whether the discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges to strike members from the petit jury violated
the fourteenth amendment. In Swain v. Alabama,7' the Court confronted
this issue. Swain, an African American, was convicted of rape.71 Swain
appealed his conviction on equal protection grounds because the prosecutor,
through the use of peremptory challenges, prevented African Americans on
the venire from becoming petit jurors.72 Although the Court acknowledged
64. Id. at 314-15.
65. Id. The motion in the trial court to modify the venire to contain one-third African
Americans was denied on the ground that the court had no authority to modify a venire which
had been drawn according to law. Id. at 315. No Virginia law at that time excluded African
Americans from jury service. Id. at 334.
66. Id. at 323.
67. Id. at 315.
68. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1880), overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975); see also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (intentional exclusion of
any identifiable group in the community which has been the subject of prejudice is unconstitu-
tional), overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282,
286 (1950) ("[j]urymen should be selected as individuals, on the basis of individual qualifica-
tions, and not as members of a race"); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (discrimination
resulting in racial exclusion from jury service is at war with the concepts of a democratic
society).
69. Rives, 100 U.S. at 322.
Nor did the refusal of the court . . . to allow a modification of the venire, by which
one-third of the jury, or a portion of it, should be composed of persons of the peti-
tioners' own race, amount to any denial of a right secured to them by any law provid-
ing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States.
Id. (emphasis in original).
70. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
71. Id. at 203.
72. Id. at 205. Six African Americans remained on the venire after counsel had exercised
their challenges for cause. The prosecutor excluded all of them with his peremptory chal-
lenges. Id.
1991]
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that the intentional exclusion of an otherwise qualified member of a recog-
nized minority group violated the fourteenth amendment, the Court denied
Swain's claim."' Instead, the Court emphasized that the peremptory chal-
lenge is a necessary part of a jury trial which eliminates extremes of partial-
ity and ensures that the petit jury render a decision based on the evidence
presented at the trial and not on hidden biases.74 Therefore, the Court held
that there exists a presumption that the prosecutor used his peremptory
challenge in an effort to obtain a fair and impartial jury and not for discrimi-
natory purposes. 7 5 To rebut this presumption, the Court announced, a de-
fendant must prove that the particular prosecutor systematically and
consistently excluded members of the particular racial group. 6
In 1986, the Court decided Batson v. Kentucky, 7 which partially over-
turned Swain. Batson was an African American convicted for second degree
burglary and receipt of stolen goods. 78 At the trial, the prosecutor exercised
his peremptory challenges to strike all four African Americans from the ve-
nire.79 Batson appealed the conviction, arguing that the prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges violated his sixth amendment right to a jury drawn
from a fair cross section of the community and his fourteenth amendment
right to equal protection of the laws.80 The Court addressed the fourteenth
amendment claim but expressed no view on the sixth amendment claim.8'
The majority held that a defendant may assert an equal protection claim
whenever the prosecutor eliminates minority jurors of the defendant's race
through peremptory challenges, even in the absence of a showing of a consis-
73. Id. at 208. The Court also noted that a defendant cannot demand a proportionate
number of his race on the venire or the petit jury. The Court concluded that "[n]either the
jury roll nor the venire need be a perfect mirror of the community or accurately reflect the
proportionate strength of every identifiable group." Id. The Court reasoned that the variety of
races and nationalities in society would make a requirement of proportional representation
impossible. IaM
74. Id. at 219. The Court also noted that the peremptory challenge is a necessary means
to exclude jurors for a real or imagined partiality which may not be demonstrated by the
proposed juror. Id at 220; see also Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892) (peremp-
tory challenge fails its full purpose if not exercised with full freedom).
75. Swain, 380 U.S. at 227.
76. Id. (citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954)); see also Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S.
128 (1940) (racial discrimination resulting in excluding otherwise qualified groups from the
jury venire "not only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with
our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government"). Id. at 130 (foot-
note omitted).
77. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
78. Id. at 82.
79. Id. at 83.
80. Id. at 83-84.
81. Id. at 84 n.4.
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tent practice of racial exclusion.82 Modifying Swain, the Batson Court held
that a defendant need only show that the prosecutor violated the fourteenth
amendment in the present case, rather than showing that the prosecutor had
consistently discriminated in prior cases.8 3 Batson thus reduced the burden
of proof placed on the defendant attacking peremptory challenges.
Accordingly, under the fourteenth amendment a defendant may attack
racially motivated peremptory challenges. For a defendant to make a prima
facie showing of discrimination under Batson, he need only show that he is a
member of a cognizable racial group, that the prosecutor used peremptory
challenges to exclude members of that same group, and that there are cir-
cumstances which raise the implication of discrimination." Once the de-
fendant has made such a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the state
to provide a neutral explanation for having excluded the particular jurors.85
B. Sixth Amendment Analysis: The Alternative Attack
on the Peremptory Challenge
The sixth amendment requires that in all criminal prosecutions the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to a trial by an impartial jury.86 Similar to the
82. Id. at 96.
83. Id.
84. Id; see The New and Improved Peremptory Challenge, supra note 16, at 1210 (explain-
ing the impact of Batson and the uncertainty which accompanies it).
85. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. The Court emphasized that the trial judge should consider the
relevant circumstances when determining whether the defendant has established a prima facie
case. The Court stated, "[w]e have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir
dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory
challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors." Id.
The prosecutor may not rebut the showing merely by stating that the minority jurors would
be partial to the defendant who was a member of their race or by affirming his good faith in the
particular challenge. Rather, the prosecutor must provide a "'clear and reasonably specific'
explanation of his 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges." Id. at 98 n.20 (quoting
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)). This requirement of
providing an explanation for the use of a particular peremptory challenge limits counsel's dis-
cretion in the exercise of a peremptory challenge when the defendant and the excluded juror
are of the same race.
86. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In 1968, the Court held that the sixth amendment guarantee
of an impartial jury was applicable to the states, and therefore provided a defendant new con-
stitutional protection against discriminatory jury selection proceedings in state courts.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). The right to trial by jury in all criminal cases was
extended to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 154.
That same year, Congress passed the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 (Act) which
allowed litigants in federal courts to have the right to a grand and petit jury selected at random
from a fair cross section of the community. Pub. L. No. 90-274, 82 Stat. 53 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1988)). This Act also prevented discrimination in jury selection
by providing that "[n]o citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit juror.., on
account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status." 28 U.S.C. § 1862.
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equal protection claims against peremptory challenges, the attack on per-
emptory challenges based on racial discrimination under the sixth amend-
ment arose in the jury venire context. 87
In Taylor v Louisiana, " the United States Supreme Court determined that
the defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial jury is satisfied as
long as the venire from which the jury was selected was comprised of a fair
cross section of the community.89 A jury drawn from a venire comprised
solely of males convicted Taylor of aggravated kidnapping.' A Louisiana
statute excluded women from serving on jury venires.91 Taylor appealed his
conviction on the grounds that the absence of females on the jury venire
deprived him of his constitutional right to " 'a fair trial by jury of a repre-
sentative segment of the community.' "92 The Court held that the statute
which excluded women from jury service violated the defendant's right to an
impartial jury.9 3 The statutory requirements., the Court reasoned, virtually
precluded a significant sector of the community from jury service and
thereby violated the fair cross section requirement of the sixth amendment.94
The Court reached its holding after summarizing its prior opinions on the
The Court has interpreted these objectives through sixth amendment cases involving discrimi-
nation and the violation of the fair cross section requirement.
The House of Representatives report on this Act stated the aim of the Act was "to assure to
all litigants that potential jurors will be selected at random from a representative cross section
of the community and that all qualified citizens will have the opportunity to be considered for
jury service." H.R. REP. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 8, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1792, 1792. The General Statement section of the report emphasized
the necessity of challenges for cause and peremptory challenges as an effective mechanism to
eliminate all forms of jury incompetence. H.R. REP. No. 1076 AT 7, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1797. Finally, the report examined the cross sectional goal
as a means to obtain a judgment based on community views. Without the cross section re-
quirement, the report concluded, juries will be biased in that they will not necessarily reflect
community views. Id.
87. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (statute which excluded women
from participating on a jury venire violated the sixth amendment).
88. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
89. Id. at 530.
90. State v. Taylor, 282 So. 2d 491, 492-93 (La. 1973), rev'd, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
91. Id. at 497.
92. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 524. The Supreme Court of Louisiana reasoned that it was not
impermissible for a State, "acting in pursuit of the general welfare," to relieve a woman from
jury service unless the woman determined that such service would not impede her responsibili-
ties. State v. Taylor, 282 So. 2d at 497.
93. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 525.
94. Id. at 531-533. The Louisiana statute provided that a woman should not be selected
for jury service unless she had previously filed a written declaration of her desire to do so. The
testimony indicated that in the defendant's parish, 53% of persons eligible for service were
women, yet the actual jury wheel contained only 10% women. Id. at 523-24. In this particu-
lar case, there were no females present on the jury venire. Id. at 524.
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role of the sixth amendment in jury selection.95 Those cases indicated that
"selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the commu-
nity is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial." 96 The Court in Taylor held that excluding identifiable segments of the
community from the jury venire denied the defendant an impartial jury and,
therefore, was inconsistent with the sixth amendment.97 The Court also
held that while the source of the petit jury must contain a fair representation
of the community, the petit jury itself need not.98 The Court thus empha-
sized that "in holding that petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly
representative of the community we impose no requirement that petit juries
actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinc-
tive groups in the population." 99
In Duren v Missouri, oo the Court affirmed Taylor and held that system-
atic exclusion of women from the jury venire violated the fair cross section
requirement of the sixth amendment.' The Duren Court, however, further
defined Taylor by establishing criteria for a defendant to prove a prima facie
violation of the sixth amendment fair cross section requirement. 0 2  In
Duren, the defendant was convicted of murder and first degree robbery.10 3
The jury that convicted Duren contained no women because a Missouri law
95. Id. at 526-28; see Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (affirming the proposi-
tion that a jury be a body representative of the community); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128
(1940) (tradition mandates that a jury be truly representative of the community). The Court
further noted that the fair cross section requirement ensures that all segments of the commu-
nity will satisfy their civic responsibility to share in the administration of justice. Taylor, 419
U.S. at 530-31.
96. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 528. Also supporting the Court's holding were congressional di-
rectives found in the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 and the accompanying legislative
history which indicated that a litigant has a right to a jury " 'selected at random from a fair
cross section of the community.'" Id. at 529 (quoting Federal Jury Selection and Service Act
of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1861).
97. Id. at 530; see also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-04 (1972), where the court stated:
When any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury
service, the effect is to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and
varieties of human experience .... It is not necessary to assume that the excluded
group will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude ... that its exclusion
deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected im-
portance in any case that may be presented.
Id.
98. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
99. Id. The Court also added that there exists no right to a particular composition on the
jury. Id. (citing Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 284 (1947)).
100. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
101. Id. at 360.
102. Id at 364.
103. State v. Duren, 556 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Mo. 1977), rev'd, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
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granted women an automatic exemption from jury service." Duren ap-
pealed his conviction on the grounds that the statute denied him his right to
trial by a jury chosen from a fair cross section of the community. 5 The
Supreme Court reversed Duren's conviction, setting forth a three part stan-
dard for establishing sixth amendment violation. The Court held that the
prima facie elements of a sixth amendment violation included: whether the
group excluded from the venire is a distinct group; 'o6 whether the represen-
tation of the distinct group on the jury panel is unreasonably below its ratio
in the community;'° 7 and whether such underrepresentation is due to sys-
tematic exclusion in the process of jury selection.' The Duren Court held
that once the defendant makes this prima facie showing, the state then bears
the burden of demonstrating that a significant state interest outweighs the
fair cross section requirement." While a significant state interest may al-
low certain exemptions, "0 the Court held that any exemption of a broad
category of persons from jury service will likely violate the sixth amend-
ment."' Still, the Court did not seek to extend the Duren test beyond the
venire phase of jury selection.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that only the source of petit juries, and not
the petit jury itself, must contain a fair or representative cross section of the
community in Lockhart v. McCree. "2 In Lockhart, the Court explained that
disqualifying a distinct group for a reason related to their ability to serve as
104. Id at 13-14. The statute allowed for the automatic exclusion of women from venires
resulting in approximately 14% women on an average venire. Duren, 439 U.S. at 367. The
Supreme Court of Missouri reasoned that exemptions from jury service were allowed to pro-
mote the "orderly and efficient" operation of the overloaded judicial system. State v. Duren,
556 S.W.2d at 14.
105. Duren, 439 U.S. at 360.
106. Id at 364. The Court found that women are a sufficiently distinct group and cannot
be systematically excluded from jury panels without violating the fair cross section require-
ment. Id
107. Id The defendant must demonstrate that the group's percentage in the community
related to its representation in the jury pool proves underrepresentation, "for this is the con-
ceptual benchmark for the sixth amendment fair-cross-section requirement." Id Duren
presented a census measurement to show that women comprised 54% of the community in
which he lived and the Court held that this established adequate prima facie evidence for this
prong of the test. Id at 364-66.
108. Id at 364. The defendant must demonstrate that the underrepresentation was system-
atic and inherent in the jury selection process used, for example, by statute precluding that
group's participation. Id at 366. Duren demonstrated that this underrepresentation occurred
consistently for over a year to establish this prima facie element. Id. at 366-67.
109. Id. at 368.
110. Id at 370. For example, exemptions based on special hardship, incapacity, or com-
munity needs constitute significant state interests. Id.
11. Id.
112. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
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impartial jurors on a particular case did not violate the fair cross section
requirement.11 ' Lockhart was convicted of capital felony murder. "4 The
trial judge, during voir dire, removed for cause prospective jurors who ad-
mitted that they could not impose the death penalty under any circum-
stances."15  The defendant appealed his conviction, contending that the
removal for cause of jurors opposed to the death penalty was improper" 6
The Supreme Court of Arkansas denied this claim." 7
Upon review, the United States Supreme Court held that the sixth amend-
ment presupposes that a fair cross section requirement on the venire will
ensure that the jury is impartial, "so long as the jurors can conscientiously
and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the
particular case.""'  The Court cautioned that when jurors are excluded for
reasons unrelated to their ability to serve impartially, the jury might be "ar-
bitrarily skewed""' in a way that could deny the defendant the "benefit of
the common-sense judgment of the community."' 2° The Court made clear,
however, that the fair cross section requirement does not apply to the petit
jury. ' While the Lockhart Court addressed challenges for cause rather
than peremptory challenges, Lockhart can be read as the Court's refusal to
limit peremptory challenges.
Accordingly, both Taylor and Lockhart imposed limitations on the fair
cross section requirement. In Taylor, the Court emphasized that although
petit juries were to be drawn from a venire composed of a fair cross section
of the community, the sixth amendment does not require that the petit jury
proportionately reflect all distinctive groups in the community.' 22 Likewise,
the Lockhart Court denounced a broad application of the fair cross section
requirement for the petit jury and held that the requirement should not be
used to invalidate the use of either for-cause or peremptory challenges to
prospective jurors.'23 The Court reasoned that "[t]he limited scope of the
fair-cross-section requirement is a direct and inevitable consequence of the
113. Id. at 184 (the Court stated that "the Constitution presupposes that a jury selected
from a fair cross section of the community is impartial").
114. McCree v. State, 266 Ark. 465, 467, 585 S.W.2d 938, 939 (1979).
115. Id. at 470-71, 585 S.W.2d at 941-42.
116. Id. at 470, 585 S.W.2d at 941 (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968)
(death sentence could not be carried out if the jury panel was chosen by excluding veniremen
for cause because they objected to the death penalty)).
117. Id. at 473-74, 585 S.W.2d at 942.
118. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 184 (1986).
119. Id. at 175.
120. Id
121. Id. at 174.
122. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
123. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 173-74. The Court stated:
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practical impossibility of providing each criminal defendant with a truly
'representative' petit jury.' ' 12 4
While the Supreme Court failed to resolve the constitutionality of the dis-
criminatory use of peremptory challenges under the sixth amendment,' 2
some lower courts had extended the fair cross section requirement to petit
juries-thereby limiting the peremptory challenge.' 26  For example, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in McCray v.
Abrams, 127 held that a prosecutor must explain the reason for his use of
peremptory challenges when a cognizable group is disproportionately ex-
cluded from the petit jury. 128 The California Supreme Court, in People v.
We have never invoked the fair-cross-section principle to invalidate the use of either
for-cause or peremptory challenges to prospective jurors, or to require petit juries, as
opposed to jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the community at
large .... We remain convinced that an extension of the fair-cross-section require-
ment to petit juries would be unworkable and unsound ....
Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted)
124. Id.; see also United States v. Childress, 715 F.2d 1313, 1320 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc)
(sixth amendment does not restrict the use of the peremptory challenge to remove African
American prospective jurors), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984).
125. The Supreme Court refused to address the proposal to extend the sixth amendment
guarantees to include a right to a fair cross section of the community on the petit jury in
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 n.4 (1986), and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299 (1989).
In Batson, although the Court had granted certiorari on the sixth amendment issue, the case
was decided solely on the fourteenth amendment issue. 476 U.S. at 112 (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing) (Batson is an exception to the rule that only questions set forth in the petition will be
considered by the Court). In Teague, the Court refused to address the sixth amendment claim
stating that a decision on the issue was not necessary to the outcome of the case. 489 U.S. at
316. In the dissenting opinion in Teague, only two Justices expressed the view that a petit jury
cross section requirement was compelled by precedent. Id. at 340-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. See McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984) (prosecutor may not unreasona-
bly restrict the possibility that petit jury will comprise fair cross section of the community),
vacated. 478 U.S. 1001 (1986); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890 (1( 78) (use of peremptory challenge to exclude African American jurors solely because of
group i ssociation violated defendant's rights to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the
commu ity); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984) (new trial granted where it could not be
determ ed whether prospective juror had been excused solely because of his race); People v.
Payne, )6 I1. App. 3d 1034, 436 N.E.2d 1046 (1982) (reasoning that the aim of the interac-
tion of cross section of the community is only effectuated at the petit jury stage and thus
racial e icrimination through peremptory challenges renders the fair cross section requirement
a nullit ); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, (right to jury of one's
peers i! violated when prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner),
cert. de ied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979).
127. 750 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1984).
128. Id. at 1115. In McCray, the prosecutor used eight of her eleven peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude African American and Hispanic individuals from the venire. The court held
that this violated the defendant's rights under the sixth amendment and that each petit jury
should contain a fair cross section of the community. Id. at 1118.
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Wheeler, '29 likewise held, under a state constitutional article similar to the
sixth amendment, that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to dis-
criminatorily exclude African Americans from the venire violated the de-
fendant's right to a petit jury drawn from a fair cross section of the
community. 3 It was not until Holland v. Illinois'13 that the Court con-
fronted the issue directly.
II. HOLLAND V ILLINOI&" REFUSAL TO EXTEND FAIR CROSS SECTION
TO THE PETIT JURY SELECTION PROCESS
In Holland v. Illinois, ' 32 the United States Supreme Court finally ad-
dressed whether the sixth amendment guarantee of a fair cross section of the
community extends to the petit jury as well as the jury venire so as to limit
peremptory challenges.' 33 In Holland, a five member majority 34 held that a
defendant does not have a sixth amendment claim against a prosecutor's use
of peremptory challenges to exclude members of a distinct group from the
petit jury. M The dissent disagreed, arguing that the use of peremptory chal-
lenges to exclude persons solely on the basis of race contravenes a defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to trial by a jury composed of a fair cross
section of the community. Moreover, the dissent contended that this consti-
tutional guarantee applies to the petit jury as well as the venire.' 36 The ten-
sion between the majority and dissenting opinions was based on whether the
sixth amendment's fair cross section requirement prevents counsel from ex-
ercising peremptory challenges to exclude cognizable groups from the petit
jury.13
7
A. No Sixth Amendment Qualification on Peremptory Challenge
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia began by analyzing Holland's argu-
ment that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike all African
American prospective jurors prevented a distinct group from being repre-
129. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). For an explanation of
McCray and Wheeler, see Note, Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, supra note 16, at
1357.
130. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 272, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
131. 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
132. Id.
133. The Supreme court granted Holland's petition for certiorari. 489 U.S. 1051 (1989).
134. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White and O'Connor joined. Justice Kennedy filed a separate concurring opinion. Justice
Marshall wrote a dissent joined by Justices Blackmun and Brennan. Justice Stevens filed a
separate dissenting opinion.
135. Holland, 493 U.S. at 487.
136. Id at 494 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 478.
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sented on his jury and thus violated his sixth amendment right. 3 ' Holland
claimed that the lack of African Americans on his jury denied him a "fair
possibility" of a representative cross section of the community on his jury.'39
In essence, Justice Scalia noted, Holland sought to apply the fourteenth
amendment equal protection test developed in Batson to his sixth amend-
ment claim."4°
Justice Scalia flatly rejected Holland's contention that the sixth amend-
ment should be employed to limit the prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
lenges because the challenges deny the defendant a "fair possibility" of a
representative jury.'4 ' Although the majority admitted that it had referred
to a "fair possibility" requirement in the past, the requirement had been
limited to the venire.' 42 Accordingly, the Court held that Holland's argu-
ment urging a prohibition on the prosecutor's ability to exclude certain
groups from the petit jury through peremptory challenges had neither a
"conceivable basis" in the text of the Constitution1 4 3 nor support from the
Court's prior opinions.'" Further, Justice Scalia asserted that extending the
fair possibility requirement to the petit jury could actually impede the sixth
amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury. 4 '
The majority then distinguished its fourteenth amendment cases on limit-
ing peremptory challenges from the sixth amendment claims. Justice Scalia
recognized that under the fourteenth amendment peremptory challenges
aimed at racial groups can be attacked.'" The Court reasoned that in those
instances, however, the unique goal of the fourteenth amendment-to eradi-
138. Id. at 476.
139. Id at 478.
140. Id. Under Holland's approach, any defendant would have standing to assert a sixth
amendment violation when African Americans are excluded from his jury through peremptory
challenges. The prosecutor would then have to provide a nondiscriminatory explanation for
his exclusion. Id
141. Id
142. Id. The Court cited Taylor v. Louisiana, Duren v. Missouri, and Lockhart v. McCree
to support its analysis that cognizable groups may not be excluded from the venire but may,
through peremptory challenges, be excluded from the petit jury. Id.; see also Ballew v. Geor-
gia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (to satisfy the "possibility" of a fair cross section on the jury, the jury
must also contain at least six persons); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (finding
that a jury comprehends a "fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the
community").
143. Holland, 493 U.S. at 478. While there is no basis for the requirement that the jury
venire include a fair cross section of the community evident in the text of the sixth amendment,
the Court has held the fair cross section requirement as necessary to ensure an impartial jury.
See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 535-36 (1975).
144. Holland, 493 U.S. at 478.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 478-79.
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cate racial discrimination-necessarily applies to both the venire and the
petit jury selection."'
The Court then turned to the sixth amendment issue. The majority
agreed that the sixth amendment imposes a fair cross section requirement on
the venire, but not on the petit jury. 4 ' The Court acknowledged that the
fair cross section requirement is not specifically required by the text of the
sixth amendment, but stems from the "traditional understanding" of how an
impartial jury is selected. '49 Relying on Taylor, the Court reasoned that the
"traditional understanding" only requires a representative venire so that the
jury will be drawn from a cross section of the community. 50 But, the Court
continued, the "traditional understanding" has never included that the state
cannot exercise peremptory challenges. 1 1
The Court supported its position by drawing a distinction between the
sixth amendment guarantee of an impartial jury rather than a representative
jury.15 2 It held that the sixth amendment only ensures a fair possibility of an
impartial jury and that the fair possibility is achieved once all cognizable
147. Id at 479.
148. Id at 480.
149. Id
150. Id
151. Id. The Court analyzed the historical purpose of peremptory challenges and con-
cluded that because peremptory challenges have been used since the founding of the nation,
the phrase "impartial jury" in the sixth amendment must be read to allow the "unbroken
tradition" of peremptory challenges. Id; see Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892).
The Court suggested that one could argue that the requirement of an impartial jury compels
peremptory challenges, but this requirement cannot be interpreted to directly or indirectly
prohibit peremptory challenges. Holland, 493 U.S. at 480.
152. Holland, 493 U.S. at 480. The Court reasoned that absent the impartiality require-
ment, a state could selectively place jurors of a particular group or belief on the venire and
thereby limit the petit jury to an impartial group. Id. If so, the Court continued, peremptory
challenges would be meaningless. Therefore, according to the Court, requiring that the venire
contains a fair cross section of the community ensures that the prosecution and defense will
start from an equal position when forming a jury. But, the Court stressed that a representative
cross section on the venire does not mean that each side may not eliminate potential jurors that
they believe would unduly favor the opposing side. Id at 481. Because a representative venire
provides both sides with a "fair hand," both can compete equally through peremptory chal-
lenge to form a jury advantageous to its side from an equally competitive starting point. Id
The Court rejected the argument that counsel could not attempt to "stack the deck" to favor
his position once a venire is representative. Id
The Court acknowledged that its holding in Holland follows the same principle the Court
announced in Lockhart. Id. at 483. In Lockhart, the Court rejected arguments that allowing
challenges for cause to remove jurors opposed to the death penalty violated the fair cross
section requirement. Id. The Court reasoned that disqualifying a group because it could not
serve impartially in a particular case, and that the state's interest in achieving an impartial jury
overrides the representativeness requirement. Id Likewise, in Holland, the Court recognized
that the legitimate state interest in achieving an impartial jury overrides the claim that the jury
is not representative. Id.
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groups are included on the venire. 1 53 Because Holland's venire contained a
representative sample of the community, his sixth amendment guarantee was
met. '
54
Finally, to support its holding, the Court concluded that its decision not
to extend a representativeness requirement to petit juries is the only plausible
reading of the sixth amendment. 5' The goal of the sixth amendment, the
Court reasoned, is jury impartiality for both the defendant and the state. 156
To extend the representative cross section requirement to the petit jury, the
Court predicted, would interfere with the fairness goal of the sixth amend-
ment.'" The Court contended that the function of the peremptory chal-
lenge is to ensure impartiality and not a representative cross section on the
petit jury.' The Court explained that peremptory challenges hold an "im-
portant position" in criminal trial procedures because they allow counsel to
eliminate partial jurors to achieve the constitutionally guaranteed unbiased
jury.' 59
Responding to Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia
warned against the "misplaced optimism" of Justice Marshall's contention
that limiting peremptory challenges would not affect the peremptory chal-
lenge system.' 6° Rather, Justice Scalia noted, many distinct groups which
cannot be excluded at the venire stage due to the fair cross section require-
ment are regularly excluded peremptorily.' 6 ' Therefore, extending the sixth
amendment guarantees to limit peremptory challenges would indeed elimi-
nate commonly exercised bases for the peremptory challenge. 162 The major-
ity countered Justice Marshall's accusation that it ignored the principles set
out in precedent 63 by reiterating that Taylor, Lockhart, and Duren specifi-
153. Id. at 478.
154. Id. at 483.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 484.
158. Id.; see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (peremptory challenges eliminate
extremes of partiality and assure an unbiased jury).
159. Holland, 493 U.S. at 484. The Court refused to accept Holland's argument that ex-
tending the representative cross section requirement to the petit jury could be done only to
ensure that African Americans get onto petit juries and need not be done to protect other
cognizable groups. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 485.
162. Id.; see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 178 (1986) (stating that the extension of
the fair cross section requirement to the petit jury is "illogical and hopelessly impractical" and
"would also likely require the elimination of peremptory challenges").
163. Holland, 493 U.S. at 485.
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cally disclaimed the application of the fair cross section requirement to the
petit jury.'64
Justice Kennedy concurred in the Court's opinion, citing no violation of
the sixth amendment.165 Justice Kennedy, however, wrote a separate opin-
ion to emphasize his belief that Holland had a valid fourteenth amendment
claim under Batson. 166 Justice Kennedy also expressly stated that a defend-
ant who is not of the same race as the excluded juror has standing to assert a
fourteenth amendment claim.
167
B. Fair Cross Section on the Petit as Limit to Peremptory Challenge
Justice Marshall, dissenting, characterized the majority opinion as a "star-
tling" result which "misrepresents" the values of the sixth amendment re-
quirements and "ignores" precedent.161 Justice Marshall asserted that the
fair cross section requirement is separate and distinct from the impartiality
requirement 169 and advocated the extension of the fair cross section require-
ment to the petit jury. 17' Alternatively, Justice Marshall contended that the
164. Id. at 486. Justice Scalia also rejected the dissent's contention that race is the underly-
ing legal issue in Holland. Id Justice Scalia warned the dissent that while it accuses the
majority of insensitivity to race-based discrimination, the accusation will "lose its intimidating
effect if it continues to be fired so randomly." Id. Justice Scalia suggested that the sixth
amendment claim would be just as strong if the jurors excluded were lawyers or clergymen
rather than African Americans. Id. While the Court acknowledged that the discriminatory
exclusion of African Americans violates the equal protection clause, the Court refused to ex-
pand the sixth amendment beyond its purpose of securing an impartial jury. Id. at 487.
165. Id. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
166. Id. Justice Kennedy agreed that a peremptory challenge based solely on race is a
violation of the juror's constitutional rights under the fourteenth amendment. Id.
167. Id. at 489-90 (stating that there is no reason a defendant's race should "deprive him of
standing in his own trial to vindicate his own jurors' right to sit"). Under the test adopted in
Batson, the defendant must show that he is a member of a "cognizable racial group" and that
the juror who was excluded is also a member of that same group. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986). The majority in Holland stated that, under the sixth amendment, such
group identification is not needed to prove standing. Holland, 493 U.S. at 476-77.
Thus, under the sixth amendment, a defendant need not be a member of the group of the
excluded juror to have standing. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 526 (1975) (male has
standing to object to the exclusion of women from the jury venire under the sixth amendment);
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 500 (1972) (any petitioner would have standing to challenge
systematic exclusion of any identifiable group from jury service under the sixth amendment).
168. Holland, 493 U.S. at 490 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("To reach this startling result, the
majority misrepresents the values underlying the fair cross-section requirement, overstates the
difficulties associated with the elimination of racial discrimination in jury selection, and ig-
nores the clear import of well-grounded precedents.").
169. Id. at 493. Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens agreed that even if impartiality were
the onily goal of the fair cross section requirement, the discriminatory exclusion of all African
Americans from the jury venire is a per se violation of the impartiality requirement. Id. at 493
n. 1.
170. Id. at 494.
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peremptory exclusion of all African American jurors solely on the basis of
race constitutes a violation of the impartiality requirement. 7 '
Justice Marshall proposed that impartiality is but one of two components
of the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury.' 72 The fair cross section
requirement is the second component and is grounded in the definition of a
jury. 7 3 Justice Marshall cited Taylor, Duren, and Lockhart to support his
view that the two guarantees of the sixth amendment should be analyzed
separately.'74 Justice Marshall argued that Lockhart held that the fair cross
section requirement had a dual purpose: to ensure an impartial jury and to
preserve public confidence and full participation of the community in the
administration of justice."7 " Justice Marshall's dissent reasoned that these
dual purposes are served only by assembling an impartial jury containing a
fair cross section of the community.' 76
Justice Marshall also challenged the majority's analysis of Lockhart for
the holding that the fair cross section requirement does not apply to the petit
jury. 177 Justice Marshall again emphasized that because the sixth amend-
ment fair cross section requirement preserves public confidence and ensures
full participation in the judicial system, 7 1 racially motivated peremptory
challenges destroy the perception that the justice system is fair.' 79 Justice
Marshall therefore reasoned that racially motivated exclusion denies the
goals of the sixth amendment whether it occurs during the selection of the
jury venire or the petit jury.'80
171. Id. at 502.
172. Id. at 493.
173. Id Justice Marshall stated that "what is denominated a 'jury' is not a 'jury' in the
eyes of the Constitution unless it is drawn from a fair cross-section of the community." Id.; see
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (five person jury insufficient to satisfy the Constitu-
tion's demand of a jury trial). Justice Marshall contended that the Court in Ballew did not rely
only on the impartiality requirement, but rather on the definition of "jury." Holland, 493 U.S.
at 493.
174. Holland. 493 U.S. at 494-95.
175. Id. at 495. The purposes articulated in Lockhart v. McCree are "(1) 'guard[ing]
against the exercise of arbitrary power' and ensuring the 'commonsense judgment of the com-
munity'... (2) preserving 'public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system,' and
(3) implementing our belief that 'sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic
responsibility.'" Lockhart, 476 U.S. 162, 174-75 (1986) (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
522, 530-31 (1975)).
176. Holland, 493 U.S. at 495.
177. Id at 496.
178. Id at 496-97.
179. Id. at 497.
180. Id. In support of this contention, the dissent cited the holding in Batson to show that
"[a] defendant's interest in obtaining the 'commonsense judgment of the community' is im-
paired by the exclusion from his jury of a significant segment of the community; whether the
exclusion is accomplished in the selection of the venire or by peremptory challenge is immate-
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Next, Justice Marshall attacked the majority's claim that the peremptory
challenge is essential to the impartiality requirement and that a fair cross
section requirement would destroy the effectiveness of the peremptory chal-
lenge. 8 ' Justice Marshall noted that, because the Court had ruled that a
state could regulate the use of peremptory challenges,' 2 the challenge can-
not be held to be essential to the impartiality requirement. 8 3 Justice Mar-
shall predicted that extending the sixth amendment's requirement to the
petit jury would have no effect on the peremptory challenge system other
than those already imposed by Batson. "4 In fact, Justice Marshall stated
that the practical effect of this result on the peremptory challenge would be
"nil."' 8 5
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion to acknowledge that a
petit jury selected through racially discriminatory means violates the sixth
amendment along with the fourteenth amendment. 8 6 Justice Stevens con-
tended that the fair cross section requirement mandates a neutral selection of
a jury.8 7 Justice Stevens believed that only through entirely neutral selec-
tion will a jury be truly impartial and thus satisfy the mandate of the sixth
amendment.' 88
rial." Id. at 496 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986)). The dissent noted that
racially based peremptory exclusion eliminates even the possibility that African Americans
will be represented on the petit jury. Id.
181. Id at 500.
182. Id. at 501 (referring to Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583 (1919)).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 502.
185. Id at 503. The dissent attempted to invalidate the majority's concern that an exten-
sion of the sixth amendment claim to the petit jury would mandate a jury which mirrors the
population. Rather, the dissent stated that only if jurors are excluded on the basis of their
membership in a distinct group would the defendant be denied the fair cross section guarantee.
Id. at 498.
The dissent also argued that an exclusion based on race clearly denies the defendant the
right to an impartial jury because the judgment imposed would not represent the judgment of
the community. The dissent advocated a ruling that the burden of proof set out in Batson be
applied to any sixth amendment claim. Id
186. Id at 504-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens contended that the two consti-
tutional provisions overlap and that "the requirement of impartiality is, in a sense, the mirror
image of a prohibition against discrimination." Id. at 506 n.4.
187. Id at 512. Justice Stevens rejected proportional representation on the jury, arguing
that "the focus on race would likely distort the jury's reflection of other groups." Id
188. Id at 515.
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III. THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE: ALIVE AND
WELL AFTER HOLLAND
A. Fair Cross Section on the Petit Jury Would Frustrate Effectiveness of
Peremptory Challenge
Increased scrutiny of the peremptory challenge under the sixth amend-
ment would undermine the function of the peremptory challenge as a
method of ensuring the sixth amendment guarantee of an impartial jury.
The peremptory challenge ensures impartiality by allowing attorneys to act
on intuition to eliminate potentially biased jurors who would otherwise
avoid exemption due to the difficult standard which the attorney must meet
to excuse a juror for cause.18 9 Accordingly, the Court has consistently rec-
ognized the importance of the peremptory challenge." 9 As early as 1965,
the Court, in Swain, noted the "very old credentials" of the peremptory
challenge system and upheld the practice as an essential part of trial by
jury.' 9' Indeed, the Court has held the peremptory challenge to be one of
the most important rights secured for the accused.' 92
Allowing judicial scrutiny of the intent behind the use of a peremptory
challenge would dramatically limit the effectiveness of the peremptory chal-
lenge. The peremptory challenge is used as a strategic tool to obtain a sym-
189. See generally Sullivan, supra note 3, at 478-81 (the two reasons given for allowing the
peremptory challenge instead of relying solely on challenges for cause are that each side should
be allowed to eliminate partial jurors and the requirement for proving the bias of a venire
person might provoke the resentment of that possible juror).
190. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975).
191. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965). In fact, long before 1965, the Court
emphasized the tradition and function of the peremptory challenge:
As was said by Blackstone . . . '[i]n criminal cases . . . there is . . . allowed to the
prisoner an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to a certain number of ju-
rors, without showing any cause at all; which is called a peremptory challenge; a
provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for which our English
laws are justly famous. This is grounded on two reasons: 1. As every one must be
sensible, what sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices we are apt to con-
ceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another; and how necessary it is that a
prisoner... should have a good opinion of his jury... ; the law wills not that he
should be tried by any one man against whom he has conceived a prejudice even
without being able to assign a reason for such his dislike. 2. Because, upon chal-
lenges for cause shown, if the reason assigned prove insufficient to set aside the juror,
perhaps the bare questioning his indifference may sometimes provoke a resentment;
to prevent all ill consequences from which, the prisoner is still at liberty, if he pleases,
peremptorily to set him aside.'
Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892) (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES 0353) (emphasis in original).
192. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894)).
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pathetic jury.' 93 The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it
allows counsel to excuse a potential juror without offering any justifica-
tion. "'94 Scrutinizing this process by demanding that counsel articulate a
specific, non-discriminatory reason for excluding a juror would inhibit
achievement of the peremptory challenge's goal of ensuring an impartial
jury. To exercise a challenge for cause, counsel must convince the court that
he has a legitimate basis for seeking the exclusion of a particular juror."'
Thus, requiring counsel to justify his exercise of the peremptory challenge as
well would render the challenge a redundancy. Moreover, at least one com-
mentator has noted that such an extension would "curtail the discretion nec-
essary to the peremptory challenge's effectiveness."' 96 Justice Marshall can
hardly contend that this effect would be "nil.' ' 97
Extension of the sixth amendment guarantee to the petit jury selection
procedure would also create an unmanageable standard for the courts. The
equal protection clause was specifically enacted to combat racial discrimina-
tion' 9g and, therefore, the scope of the fourteenth amendment is correspond-
ingly limited by that purpose. The sixth amendment, however, was enacted
to prevent unfair trial proceedings and its protection extends to members of
any cognizable groups.' 99 Because the sixth amendment's scope is not lim-
ited, as is the fourteenth amendment's, it would be difficult to determine
where the bounds of the peremptory challenge would fall. Thus, extending
the fair cross section requirement to the petit jury under the sixth amend-
ment would inevitably limit peremptory challenges based on distinctions
other than race.2"° For example, other distinct groups could suddenly fall
193. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
194. See Lewis, 146 U.S. at 378.
195. See Note, supra note 17, at 230; see also Alschuler, The Overweight Schoolteacher
From New Jersey and Other Tales: The Peremptory Challenge After Batson, 25 CRIM. L.
BULL. 57 (1989).
196. Note, Limitations on the Peremptory Challenge, supra note 16, at 1369 (reasoning that
if a sixth amendment limitation test is to be given any effect, an explanation given for the
particular use of the peremptory challenge must necessarily approximate the explanation re-
quired under a challenge for cause).
197. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 490 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Batson v.
Kentucky, Justice Marshall advocated banning peremptory challenges altogether in criminal
trials. "The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort the jury process by permit-
ting the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds should ideally lead the Court to ban them en-
tirely from the criminal justice system." 476 U.S. 79, 107 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).
198. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). The fourteenth amendment was
designed to protect a recently emancipated race: to give to it the equal protection of the laws
and to deny any state the power to withhold these rights. Id at 306.
199. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
200. See generally Comment, Skin Color Doesn't Reason: Closing The Door on the Dis-
criminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 64 U. DET. L. REv. 171 (1986).
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under the sixth amendment fair representation requirement. As Justice
Scalia noted, jurors opposed to the death penalty are treated as a distinct
group as are doctors and lawyers.2 ' To establish that a group is distinct
under the sixth amendment. the defendant would merely have to show that
the group is defined and lim.ited by some distinctive factor; that the group
shares a common thread or basic similarity in attitudes, ideas, or experience;
and that the group shares a community interest such that its interests cannot
be represented adequately if the group is exempted from the jury selection
process.2"2 It is difficult to conceive of any group that could not meet these
requirements. Once a distinctive group is identified, counsel would have lit-
tle leeway in eliminating anyone, and thus in forming an impartial jury
through peremptory challenges.
The administrative problems of extending the scope of the sixth amend-
ment would be significant. Extending the fair cross section requirement
would flood the jury selection process with attacks on the use of the peremp-
tory challenge on the basis of sex, religion, economic status, and any other
distinctive group membership.20 3 A requirement that jury panels strictly
mirror the community would compel the purposeful selection of jury lists
rather than their selection at random.2 "4 This is inherently inconsistent with
the purpose of random selection as a method to secure an impartial jury.
Although the dissent disclaimed any effect on the random selection pro-
cess,20 ' the process would have to consider all characteristics in the commu-
nity to allow for the representation of all groups on the petit jury.2"s This
would require a great deal of additional time and money.2"7 Not only is
201. Holland, 493 U.S. at 485.
202. Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212, 1216 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1256
(1984); see United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1245
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973).
203. See Holland, 493 U.S. at 485. Justice Scalia noted that race was not inherent in the
Court's opinion. "[The] sixth amendment claim would be just as strong if the object of the
exclusion had been... postmen, or lawyers, or clergymen, or any number of other identifiable
groups." Id.
204. See Note, supra note 8, at 1729.
205. Holland, 493 U.S. at 499 (Marshall, I., dissenting).
206. The dissent characterized the majority's claim as resting on the consequences of ac-
cepting Holland's argument:
[T]hat acceptance of Holland's argument would be the first step down a slippery
slope leading to a criminal justice system in which trial judges would be required to
engineer each jury to reflect, in its few members, all of the myriad demographic
groups of which American society is composed.
Id. at 498.
207. See King v. County of Nassau, 581 F. Supp. 493, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[a] great deal
of time, effort and expense would be necessary to attempt to determine whether any given
peremptory challenge is legal"). But see Comment, supra note 200, at 199 (the administrative
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such a mandate unworkable and unsound, it would effectively deny a de-
fendant his sixth amendment right to an impartial jury. The dissent's reli-
ance on Batson to support the proposed extension of the sixth amendment
fair cross section requirement to the petit jury is misplaced. Batson involved
the fourteenth amendment and dealt exclusively with racial discrimination.
Based on the explicit anti-discrimination language in the fourteenth amend-
ment, the case logically extended the limit on the use of discriminatory per-
emptory challenges to both the venire and the petit.208 The sixth
amendment guarantee, however, has a different focus. The sixth amendment
endeavors to ensure the accused a fair possibility that his jury will be com-
posed of a representative cross section of the community.2 ' 9 Therefore, as
evidenced by the term "possibility," the cross section requirement logically
extends only to the venire. The two amendments seek to achieve different
constitutional goals, and thus the disparate results of applying the sixth
rather than the fourteenth amendment should not be surprising
2
'
0
B. Jury Selection Without the Peremptory Challenge
As a consequence of Holland, actions for racial motivation in the use of
peremptory challenges must be based on a fourteenth amendment violation,
and the fair cross section requirement imposed by the sixth amendment is
limited to the jury venire. More importantly, the holding ensures that the
peremptory challenge will survive as a medium to guarantee defendants an
impartial jury. Any other conclusion would adversely affect both a defend-
ant's rights and the entire jury selection process.
An extension of the fair cross section requirement to the petit jury would
significantly enhance the role of the voir dire. A challenge for cause depends
upon the information which is given during voir dire.2 1' If peremptory chal-
lenges must be substantiated, they are not distinguishable from challenges
problems of representativeness identified by the proponents of the sixth amendment limitation
are misdirected).
208. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); see Holland, 493 U.S. at 479.
209. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
210. The dissent also ignores the fact that the Court has repeatedly denied an extension of
the fair cross section requirement to the petit jury. In Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162
(1986), the Court stated that an extension of the fair cross section requirement to petit juries
would be unworkable and unsound. Id. at 178. In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975),
the Court again made clear that it imposed no requirement that petit juries must mirror the
community and reflect the distinctive groups of the population. lId at 538. The Court has
interpreted the sixth amendment to guarantee only a fair possibility that a fair cross section of
the community for a jury venire will be obtained. The Court has further indicated that this
fair possibility is created when the venire is composed of a representative cross section of the
community. Id at 525.
211. See Note, supra note 8, at 1720.
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for cause and thus the importance and extent of voir dire increases.21 2 With-
out an effective peremptory challenge, the exclusion of possibly impartial
jurors could only be accomplished through challenges for cause. Thus, voir
dire would be used to reveal even subtle biases to substantiate a reason for
the strike. In the process, voir dire would become overly extensive and bur-
densome. In United States v. Clark 213 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit declined to impose limitations on the peremptory
challenge for just this reason.214 The Seventh Circuit found that allowing
such an attack would transform voir dire into a virtual Title VII proceed-
ing.215 In order to substantiate a motion to excuse a particular juror for
cause, counsel would be forced to expand voir dire and thus lengthen the
selection process.
An extension of the fair cross section requirement, and thereby a more
extensive voir dire, would pressure judges to lower their standards for excus-
ing a juror for cause.216 Such an extension would also require judges to
scrutinize the use of peremptory challenges in order to uncover any racial
217motivation. In turn, due to the possibility of attack on their intent, attor-
neys will be pressured when choosing which members to excuse with their
peremptory challenge.
IV. CONCLUSION
Extending the fair cross section requirement to the petit jury as a means to
provide a sixth amendment guarantee against racial discrimination is unnec-
essary. The fourteenth amendment already provides a device to challenge
racially motivated use of peremptory challenges. The scope of the sixth
amendment protection relates to jury impartiality. Impartiality requires that
a defendant have the possibility that he will be judged by a jury selected from
a representative cross section of the community. This possibility does not
require a fair cross section on the petit jury.
212. See Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 433 (1887).
213. 737 F.2d 679 (7th Cir. 1984).
214. Id. at 682-83; Note, supra note 8, at 1733.
215. Clark, 737 F.2d at 682.
216. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). In McCleskey, Justice Brennan articu-
lates the rationale for the deference accorded peremptory challenges. "The rationale for this
deference has been a belief that the unique characteristics of particular prospective jurors may
raise concern on the part of the prosecution or defense, despite the fact that counsel may not be
able to articulate that concern in a manner sufficient to support exclusion for cause." Id at
337 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Note, supra note 8, at 1723 (proposing to decrease
criteria for a challenge for cause under these circumstances).
217. See generally Comment, supra note 200, at 188.
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Peremptory challenges ensure that the goal of impartiality will be accom-
plished. Limiting the peremptory challenge by extending the fair cross sec-
tion requirement to the petit jury will eliminate an essential means to
accomplish what the sixth amendment mandate-an impartial jury. The
sixth amendment contains an internal tension. While it requires the fair pos-
sibility that the jury contain a representative cross section of the community,
it also limits who may serve on the jury by eliminating partial jurors. In
Holland, the Court properly balanced these competing goals.
Alice Biedenbender

